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THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINING CORPORATE
CONSCIENCE-
KENNETH E. GOODPASTER*
We can understand character better when we see it as the
product of self-preserving efforts to deal with inner impulses and
external demands. In both personality and institutions "self-pres-
ervation" means more than bare organic or material survival.
Self-preservation has to do with the maintenance of basic identity,
with the integrity of a personal or institutional "self."
Leaders must think not only descriptively, but also pre-
scriptively about corporate values. To do so, it is not suffi-
cient simply to produce a corporate code or credo. What is
more important is the state of mind-the mindset-that lies
behind the formulas, and the policies and practices that give
the formulas their operational meaning. Leaders must learn
how to identify and, where needed, to modify an organiza-
tion's mindset. Once they have done so, they face the chal-
lenge of sustaining those values over time. This latter chal-
lenge will be our principal focus in the main body of this
article (Parts II, III, and IV). In the introduction (Part I), we
will set the stage.'
PART I: AN ETHICAL TYPOLOGY
There are three broad patterns by which rational self-
interest can be combined with respect for others, whether
the mindset be that of an individual or of an organization.
The first of these patterns completely subordinates ethics to
self-interest as a means to an end, whereas the second and
third patterns give more attention to ethical values in corpo-
t Copyright © 1987 by Kenneth E. Goodpaster. All Rights
Reserved.
* Associate Professor, Harvard University Graduate School of Busi-
ness Administration.
1. P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL IN-
TERPRETATION 17-18 (1957).
2. The typology presented in Part I is also presented and discussed
in the context of empirical value measurement in Goodpaster, The Moral
Agenda of Corporate Leadership: Concepts and Research Techniques, Proceed-
ings of the 1986 Donald S. MacNaughton Symposium, Syracuse University.
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rate policy, albeit in different ways. Each pattern shows some
internal variation while maintaining a distinct logic of its
own. I shall refer to them as follows: Type I thinking (ethics
as a means to self-interest); Type 2 thinking (ethics as an ex-
ternal constraint); and Type 3 thinking (ethics as an end). Case
illustrations will allow us to explore each of these patterns.
Type 1. Ethics as a Means to Self-Interest
Among the most natural ways of combining or relating
two basic values for guiding conduct is to treat one as a
means to the other. Thus we can imagine an individual main-
taining that his basic value is to look out for himself in a ra-
tional way, and that one of his means for doing so is to be
respectful of other persons most of the time. I will refer to
this as Type 1 thinking. Organizations might exhibit a similar
mindset. The belief would be that respect for others, like
honesty, is often "the best policy."
A Type 1 view of the relationship between self-interest
and ethics may have been in the mind of business consultant
Albert Z. Carr when he compared business to a game of
poker. In an article entitled "Is Business Bluffing Ethical?"
Carr wrote:
To be a winner, a man must play to win. This does not
mean that he must be ruthless, cruel, harsh, or treacherous.
On the contrary, the better his reputation for integrity,
honesty, and decency, the better his chances of victory will
be in the long run. But from time to time, every business-
man, like every poker player, is offered a choice between
certain loss or bluffing within the legal rules of the game. If
he is not resigned to losing, if he wants to rise in his com-
pany and industry, then in such a crisis he will bluff-and
bluff hard.'
Honesty or ethics seems here to be instrumental to "win-
ning," that is, to be valued as a means. To be sure, law is
mentioned as a constraint, but Carr may be implying that
avoidance of legal sanctions is simply in one's interest, moti-
vated by self-protection rather than by moral considerations.
3. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, HARv. Bus. REV. 143, 153 (Jan.-
Feb. 1968).
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This way of joining ethics to self-interest accords no author-
ity to respect as an independent value."
A case that illustrates the Type 1 mindset comes from re-
search on the export of hazardous chemicals.8 In 1977, work-
ers at a plant in California that produced a pesticide called
DBCP were found to be sterile, whereupon the state canceled
the use of DBCP within its jurisdiction. Several major compa-
nies stopped producing DBCP immediately. In 1979 the EPA
canceled all uses of DBCP (except for use on Hawaiian pine-
apples) because it was suspected of being carcinogenic.
After the ban, the American Vanguard Corporation
(Amvac) could no longer sell DBCP directly to American
companies, but it did continue to export it. The company's
1979 10-K report noted that the principal manufacturers and
distributors of the product (DOW, Occidental, and Shell
Chemical) had, temporarily at least, decided to remove them-
selves from the domestic marketplace and possibly from the
world marketplace.6
The report continued:
Notwithstanding all the publicity and notoriety surround-
ing DBCP, it was [our] opinion that a vacuum existed in the
marketplace that [we] could temporarily occupy. . . . [We]
further believed that with the addition of DBCP, sales
might be sufficient to reach a profitable level.'
In this instance, Amvac management gave ethics merely
instrumental status. Self-interest (in the form of profitability
and competitive advantage) was the governing mindset value,
with concern for workers, consumers and the general public
relegated to a subordinate position.
Type 1 thinking is present wherever respect-oriented val-
ues are managed with an eye to rational self-interest as the
overarching value. It is important to emphasize, however,
that this need not mean ignoring others. Some interpretations
of "issues management" and "public relations," for example,
4. Many philosophical frameworks specify ways to build ethics into
practical decisions. They are treated here under the heading of respect for
others in contrast to rational self-interest. For a detailed analysis, see J.
MATTHEWS, K. GOODPASTER, & L. NASH, POLICIES AND PERSONS: A CASEBOOK
IN BUSINESS ETHICS 492-522 (1985) [hereinafter MATrHEwS &
GOODPASTER].
5. Id. at 467.
6. Id.
7. AMERICAN VANGUARD CORPORATION, 1979 FORM 10-K ANNUAL RE-
PORT 8 (1980).
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seem to fit the Type 1 pattern, at least when their sole basis is
corporate self-interest.
Type 2. Ethics as an External Constraint
Type 2 thinking incorporates respect for others not
merely as a means to rationally chosen ends but as a con-
straint on the choice of those ends. There are two distinct
subtypes. The first, the invisible hand pattern, looks primar-
ily to market forces as a surrogate for morality; the second,
the visible hand pattern, to political and legal forces.
Type 2a. The Invisible Hand Pattern
Some persons accord importance to ethics in business de-
cision making, but quickly insist that ethics are built into the
competitive system. In what we shall call (remembering
Adam Smith) the invisible hand pattern, special attention to
ethics becomes redundant. Conscious efforts to behave ethi-
cally are viewed as foolish, even morally suspect. Nobel laure-
ate Milton Friedman often seems to endorse this way of
thinking. In an article whose title, "The Social Responsibility
of Business is to Increase Its Profits," almost proclaims the
invisible hand view, Friedman wrote:
In [many cases], there is a strong temptation to rationalize
actions as an exercise of "social responsibility." In the pre-
sent climate of opinion, with its widespread aversion to
"capitalism," "profits," the "soulless corporation" and so
on, this is one way for a corporation to generate goodwill as
a by-product of expenditures that are entirely justified in its
own self-interest ...
• . . If our institutions, and the attitudes of the public make
it in their self-interest to cloak their actions in this way, I
cannot summon much indignation to denounce them. At
the same time, I can express admiration for those individual
proprietors or owners of closely held corporations or stock-
holders of more broadly held corporations who disdain
such tactics as approaching fraud. 8
At another place in the same article, however, one senses
a different, but related, point of view. Quoting from his book
Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman wrote:
8. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970, at 124.
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[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of busi-
ness-to use its resources and engage in activities designed
to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free compe-
tition without deception or fraud.'
This second passage seems, like the first, to imply that ethics
is not just a means to self-interest. But apparently more
weight is placed on social and legal constraints than on mar-
ket forces alone. The "rules of the game" serve as a moral
authority beyond the market-noneconomic surrogates for
conscience. Thus, Friedman's conception of corporate social
responsibility is formed not only by constraints of the market,
but apparently also by external social and legal constraints. I
shall identify these latter constraints as "visible hand" con-
straints, discussed below as Type 2b thinking.
Type 2b. The Visible Hand Pattern
Type 2b thinking relies on noneconomic forces outside
the organization to secure certain values without direct man-
agerial involvement-a "visible" rather than an "invisible"
hand. A corporate leader with this kind of mindset might be
committed, for example, to the importance of both cost con-
trol and environmental protection, but might not pay as
much attention to the latter as to the former. He or she
would view business ethics as "playing by the rules" laid
down by local laws and customs. In the area of environmental
protection, ethical conduct would be that-and only
that-conduct which is required by the EPA.
Externalizing moral judgment in this way is not the same
as subordinating ethics (as a means) to rational self-interest.
But it does mean placing responsibility for moral judgment
outside the manager's principal (economic) concerns. (We
might say that the Type 2b leader acknowledges authority, but
not accountability, when it comes to ethical values.)
Type 2 thinking in both of its versions can be seen in the
case of a tough-minded president of a New England air-com-
pressor firm.' 0 An idealistic MBA from a well-known business
school had recently been hired to direct the company's Com-
mittee on Corporate Responsibility. After making a number
of suggestions for change, including more attention to con-
sumer safety and withdrawal from South Africa, the MBA
9. Id. at 126.
10. MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 52.
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was stunned by the president's reply:
As far as the safety of our products and other demands
consumers might make, that's all done through the market-
place, as you will come to understand. If our products were
not safe or durable they wouldn't sell. .... It's our responsi-
bility to decide after careful market research what the air-
compressor needs of America are and will be in the future.
We don't need a special panel of bleeding hearts to lead us
along paths where we are already expert."
The president then fired a second blast:
As for our selling operations in South Africa, I'm afraid
you just don't know what you're talking about. As long as
there is no plank of American foreign policy or Federal law
which tells corporations where they can and where they
can't sell their products, American businesses must depend
on the free market system."'
The president's first response was a Type 2a comment,
the second response a Type 2b comment. Chagrined and con-
fused, the young executive walked out believing that while
his superior may have cared about corporate responsibility,
the type of thinking he showed (ethics as an external con-
straint) was inadequate.
Type 3. Ethics as an End
According to Type 3 thinking, neither the invisible hand
nor the more visible hands of government, labor or the me-
dia are sufficient to secure respect for others. Rational self-
concern is not ignored, but concern for others guides the
leader's consciousness. This way of thinking not only refuses
to see ethics as merely a means, but also rejects surrogates for
conscience in the form of external constraints. Managerial ac-
countability for ethics goes hand in hand with a recognition
of its authority.
The prologue to a statement of beliefs developed by
Chairman James Ber6 of Borg-Warner Corporation reveals a
mindset rooted in Type 3 thinking:
Any business is a member of a social system, entitled to the
rights and bound by the responsibilities of that member-
ship. Its freedom to pursue economic goals is constrained
11. Id. at 55.
12. Id. at 55-56.
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by law and channeled by the forces of a free market. But
these demands are minimal, requiring only that a business
provide wanted goods and services, compete fairly, and
cause no obvious harm. For some companies that is enough.
It is not enough for Borg-Warner. We impose upon our-
selves an obligation to reach beyond the minimal. We do so
convinced that by making a larger contribution to the soci-
ety that sustains us, we best assure not only its future vital-
ity, but our own.18
As the last sentence indicates, Ber6 does not abandon en-
lightened self-interest. But he also affirms the equal impor-
tance of ethical values. The implication is that the respect for
others which is reflected in Types 2a and 2b thinking is mini-
mal, even if crucial. The company sees itself as accountable in
a way that goes "beyond the minimal."
Sustaining Corporate Conscience
In what follows, we will examine some of the challenges
that confront the corporate leader who would institutionalize
and sustain a Type 3 mindset in his or her organization. This
task, when it is directed toward organizational members and
subgroups, includes such activities as management selection
and development, performance evaluation, executive succes-
sion, and (in the case of large corporations) acquisition and
divestiture of business units. When it is directed toward the
wider socioeconomic system, the task of sustaining corporate
values includes business communication and public relations,
advertising, business-government relations, and international
business activities.
Sustaining corporate conscience has to do with leader-
ship actions aimed at congruence-what Chester Barnard re-
ferred to as "fit"-between the mindset of the organization
and the mindsets of both its future leaders and its wider insti-
tutional environment. 14 Without some degree of ethical fit or
congruence, the corporate mindset simply cannot survive or
replicate itself.
Part II introduces the concepts of mindset stability and
degrees of fit among mindset types. In Part III, these con-
cepts are illustrated using case studies from actual business
13. BORG-WARNER CORPORATION, THE BELIEFS OF BORG-WARNER: To
REACH BEYOND THE MINIMAL (1982), reprinted in MATTHEWS & GOOD-
PASTER, supra note 4, at 150.
14. C. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938).
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practice. Part IV presents (and seeks to resolve) a practical
and philosophical paradox associated with the search for
mindset stability.
PART II: MINDSET STABILITY AND DEGREES OF ETHICAL FIT
It is essential for sustaining a company's culture that the
values of its future leaders (personal or micro-values) and the
values of its surrounding community (economic, political, and
social macro-values) be "hospitable" or congruent. These are
the main factors that tend either to resist or reinforce the
corporate conscience. But if some degree of ethical fit is
needed, the question naturally arises: How much? In answer
to this question, leaders must consider a spectrum of alterna-
tives, ranging from low through medium to high degrees of
congruence.
In the low range, there is little or (at the limit) no
fit-either between individual values and organizational val-
ues or between organizational values and the values of the
wider social system. From the point of view of the individual
in the organization or the organization in the community, the
low range implies a maximal degree of pluralism and a mini-
mal degree of congruence. Looking in the other direction,
from the system to the organization and from the organiza-
tion to the individual, low-range fit implies a kind of ethical
decentralization, to the point of value anarchy. Sustaining an
organizational mindset seems impossible in this range, since
the forces tending to dismantle it (ethical analogues to en-
tropy) are at their strongest both from within and from with-
out the corporation.
In the high range, there is almost perfect fit among
mindset levels. The individual is an ethical "organization per-
son" and the organization is in strict ethical accord with its
surrounding system. We might expect stability in such cir-
cumstances, but stability is not the inevitable result. If, as
seems likely, the price of such high congruence is rigid en-
forcement, stability may or may not be the ultimate outcome.
On this score, it is useful to study totalitarian systems and or-
ganizations that imitate totalitarian practices in relation to
the individual. The rigidity, perhaps even tyranny, of the
high range stands in dramatic contrast to the ethical anarchy
of the low range.
The medium range strikes varying points of balance be-
tween too much and too little congruence. Corporate leaders
seeking to achieve this range will try to respect individual
[Vol. 2
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moral autonomy but will limit such autonomy to within the
boundaries of a reasonably well-defined corporate value
structure. Likewise, corporate moral initiative in the wider
value system will be encouraged but may also be restrained.
The ranges described above help to clarify the idea of
mindset stability, much as the typology in Part I clarified the
idea of mindset orientation. These ranges provide a logical
map of the generic options without prescribing which option
should be pursued in a given corporate environment.
An Image for Understanding Mindset Congruence
A corporate mindset might or might not resemble either
the mindsets of key individuals within the organization or the
institutional structures surrounding the organization. Such a
phenomenon was explored visually by the Dutch artist M.C.
Escher as shown in Figure I below. Escher's study of "Fishes
and Scales" suggests three features of mindsets that we can
use to interpret mindset stability: they are nested, self-similar,
and dynamic.1 5 Nesting refers to the existence of mindsets
within mindsets, as in the case of individual mindsets existing
within a corporate mindset. Self-similarity refers to the con-
gruence of nested mindsets; that is, the degree to which indi-
vidual mindsets resemble corporate mindsets, and corporate
mindsets resemble the mindset of the wider community. Fi-
nally, dynamism concerns the flexibility of mindsets, and ulti-
mately the evolution of mindsets over time.
The active figures are drawn at different scales with a
medium degree of similarity to one another, like the ethical
values of individuals within organizations within a surround-
ing social system. The artist avoids dissonance between levels
as well as suffocating conformity.
15. Escher's fascination with nested figures has been pursued to a
high level of sophistication in recent years by the fractal geometry of
Harvard mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot. The notion of fractal "self-
similarity" is described in Goodpaster, Toward an Integrated Approach to
Business Ethics, THOUGHT, 161 (June 1985).
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The Escher image prompts two particular questions in
connection with leadership and value stability. First, what is
an appropriate degree of "value tolerance" in an organiza-
tion, avoiding both indifference and dogmatism? And second,
what is an appropriate degree of "value tolerance" in a social
system made up of organizations and institutions?
These questions, when approached from the perspective
of the more embracing group looking inward, call to mind
classical issues in political and legal theory, particularly ques-
tions about the merits of constitutional democracy, due pro-
cess, and pluralism. 16 What limits can society legitimately
place on corporations (and corporations on their members) in
view of the exclusively economic function that has tradition-
ally defined their relationships in the past? Are these limits
changing? How and why?
16. For an extended discussion of these classical issues in political and
legal theory, see Chapters 1 and 2 of H.L.A. HART, LAW LIBERTY AND MO-
RALITY (1963).
I Vol. 2
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Approached from the opposite direction, from the per-
spective of the individual or the organization looking out-
ward, these questions call to mind such issues as free expres-
sion and free assembly, as well as civil disobedience. Do
members of organizations (and organizations themselves) de-
serve broader protections than those currently accorded by
law? What does this mean for the traditional "termination at
will" doctrine? or "whistleblowing"? or civil liberties in (and
of) the corporation?"7
PART III. MINDSET STABILITY IN PRACTICE
In Part I, cases were presented to clarify each of the
mindset types in various business settings. Here we will use
cases to illustrate different degrees (low, medium, and high)
of ethical congruence and to examine the implications of va-
rious levels of mindset stability for such issues as employee
rights and public/private sector relationships. Part IV will
then address the problems which arise in both the low range
and the high range of congruence, especially when a Type 3
mindset is the leader's goal.
From the perspective of top management, the sources of
mindset stability (or instability) can be classified under the
headings of microfits, the relationship between the organiza-
tion and its members, and macrofits, the relationship between
the organization and the wider community.
Microfits: The Organization and Its Members
In relatively small, entrepreneurial organizations, where
the influence of the leader is most direct, a company's mind-
set (whether it includes respect as a fundamental value or
not) depends primarily on the values of the person at the
helm. In such companies, passing on the corporate mindset
to the next generation amounts to identifying and grooming
a successor for the president who will preserve the company's
value orientation.
In large organizations, however, this task is much more
complicated. While the leader of a large corporation must be
17. Some observers believe that the courts are departing from a lais-
sezfaire posture and moving toward a more intrusive one on issues of free
speech, privacy, and freedom of conscience. David Ewing argues for "con-
stitutionalizing" the corporation as an alternative. Ewing, Civil Liberties in
the Corporation, 50 N.Y. ST. B. J. 188 (1978). Recent debates over employee
drug testing illustrate the strong forces on both sides of this issue.
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concerned with choosing and grooming a successor, he or she
must also attend to the development of subordinate manag-
ers. "[A]s an organization grows larger and as operations be-
come more decentralized," Kenneth Andrews points out,
"the power and influence of the chief executive are reinter-
preted and diffused.""8 There must be a pool of talented
managers who are capable of joining rationality-oriented
(self-interest) values to respect-oriented values in a way that
preserves with some degree of fidelity the convictions of the
chief executive officer. Developing and maintaining this pool
is an ongoing leadership challenge.
I am aware of one chief executive of a Fortune 100 com-
pany who has responded to this challenge with great care and
self-awareness. Not only does he monitor personally and reg-
ularly the progress of seventy-five key managers in his corpo-
ration, he does so with explicit attention to the congruence
between their beliefs and attitudes and the overall corporate
value system. In one instance, an otherwise very strong exec-
utive who was considered in line to be C.E.O. was asked to
resign for reasons related directly to his cynicism about the
company's stated philosophy of human values. It should be
added that the executive's resignation was requested with the
full understanding, counsel, and support of the board of
directors.
Another chief executive officer has worked with his
board of directors in developing a set of criteria for apprais-
ing the character traits and qualifications of candidates for
leadership roles in the corporation. The criteria include not
only experience, intelligence, and economic performance,
but also integrity, maturity, balance, and community service.
In both of these cases, the leaders involved were, by their
own accounts, protecting and sustaining a mindset that they
had helped create in their organizations. Two other illustra-
tions may help to clarify the leadership implications of seek-
ing mindset stability from within, that is, of achieving
microfits.
The first involves Velsicol Chemical Corporation, a Chi-
cago-based multinational. 9 Velsicol had a reputation before
1978 as a "corporate renegade that seems totally lacking in
18. Andrews, Can the Best Corporations be Made Moral, HARv. Bus.
REV. 57, 60 (May-June 1973).
19. See K. GOODPASTER & D. WHITESIDE, VELSICOL CHEMICAL CORPORA-
TION (A) (Harvard Business School Case Services No. 9-385-021, 1984).
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public responsibility.""0 Its management was eventually re-
formed by Ben Heineman, the president of its parent com-
pany, Northwest Industries. Heineman remarked candidly af-
ter implementing certain changes that he should have acted
sooner:
When [Velsicol's former C.E.O.] was making speeches per-
sonally attacking the administrator of EPA, I did take a po-
sition that I was not going to interfere in the chief execu-
tive's activities in connection with his own company-even
though based on many, many years of government experi-
ence I thought they were extremely foolish. . . I probably
made a significant mistake in applying our decentralization
policy to anything that sensitive."
Heineman's experience illustrates the importance of
what we are calling microfit between corporate values and
the values of key persons and business units. Heineman ap-
parently saw himself as having gone too far toward what we
have called low range mindset congruence, to the point
where corrective intervention was necessary. The leadership
of the parent company brought the mindset of the subsidiary
into alignment, from one in which respect seemed to be
merely an instrumental value, as in Type I thinking, to one in
which Type 2 or Type 3 reasoning predominated.
It is interesting to note as a second case illustration and
as a prelude to the next section that some corporate leaders
have drawn a sharp ethical line between microfits and
macrofits. One such leader was Arthur Wiebel, President of
Tennessee Coal and Iron (TCI), a division of United States
Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel)." In the 1960s, Weibel, both
as a private citizen of Birmingham, Alabama, and as an able
leader of TCI, was very active in support of civil rights for
blacks. He initiated broad changes in discriminatory labor
agreements and sent strong signals to managers and employ-
ees regarding fairness in hiring, promotion, and job assign-
ments within the company. He sought energetically a fit be-
tween his own values and TCI's commitment to racial justice
within the company.
But when asked obliquely by the Kennedy Administra-
tion to use TCI's substantial influence to improve racial jus-
tice in the Birmingham community, Wiebel backed away. In
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 3.
22. MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 173.
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the words of U.S. Steel's Chairman of the Board Roger
Blough:
[Als individuals we can exercise what influence we may
have as citizens, but for a corporation to attempt to exert
any kind of economic compulsion to achieve a particular
end in the social area seems to me to be quite beyond what
a corporation should do and quite beyond what a corpora-
tion can do.
I believe that while government . may seek to com-
pel social reforms, any attempt by a private organization
like [TCI] to impose its views, its beliefs and its will upon
the community . . . would be repugnant to our American
constitutional concepts, and that appropriate steps to cor-
rect this abuse of corporate power would be universally de-
manded by public opinion."'
Wiebel apparently had two different standards regarding
value fit between a company and its employees, on the one
hand, and value fit between a company and its surrounding
community, on the other. Debates during the 1980s about
responsible business activity in South Africa suggest that the
"TCI issue" is still very much alive.
Let us now take a closer look at the challenges facing the
corporate leader (both nationally and internationally) when it
comes to external value congruence.
Macrofits: The Organization and the Wider Community
A stable corporate mindset requires not only the achieve-
ment of reasonable fit between the values of an organization
and those of its present and future leaders, but also a reason-
able fit in the direction of the larger network of organiza-
tions and institutions that we refer to collectively as "soci-
ety." Just as one would expect an individual in an
organization to have some impact, however limited, on the
values of the organization as a whole (even if the influence of
the organization on the individual is likely to be stronger), so
it is with an organization in its community.
In order for corporate values to continue for any signifi-
cant period of time, they must not only be affirmed by indi-
viduals in leadership positions who share those values but
they must-also be supported from the outside by a value sys-
23. Id. at 179.
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tem that accords them validity and respect. Otherwise, those
values probably will be undermined by the law, the regula-
tory process, industry competition, and public pressure. This
was the principal argument used by critics of Arthur Wiebel's
position in the TCI case.
Corporate values within the social system, like individual
values within the organization, can have very real influence.
To return to the example of South Africa, corporate signato-
ries to the Sullivan Principles have sought to avoid the di-
lemma of choosing between complete disinvestment and con-
tributing to what most regard as social injustice.24 Dresser
Industries decided after much controversy that it could not
or would not seek such influence.2 5 IBM, on the other hand,
took a different approach. Although it refused for many
years to close down its operations in South Africa, it reaf-
firmed a policy of working for social change from within,
both independently and through its commitment to the Sulli-
van principles." In 1986, IBM sold its subsidiary, but contin-
ued to sell products through the newly independent South
African company.27 Other companies have pulled out en-
tirely, believing that their continued business activity in
South Africa only served to reinforce the status quo."
One of the corporations mentioned earlier as an illustra-
tion of the microfit issue, Velsicol, also faced the issue of
macrofit. During 1983 and 1984, the "new" Velsicol at-
tempted to initiate industry self-regulation in the export of
hazardous chemicals by proposing a "One World Communi-
cation System" for pesticide labeling.29 The idea was to cre-
24. See J. MATTHEWS & R. MASSIE, JR., THE INTERFAITH CENTER ON
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DEBATE OVER SOUTH AFRICAN DISIN-
VESTMENT (Harvard Business School Case Services No. 9-386-149, 1986)
[hereinafter J. Matthews & R. Massie, Jr.].
25. See MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 430.
26. See J. MATTHEWS & R. MASSIE, JR. supra note 24, at 10.
27. See LB.M. is Shedding South Africa Unit; Pressure is Cited, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 22, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
28. See, e.g., G.M. Plans to Sell South Africa Unit to a Local Group, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (reporting that on October 20, 1986, the
General Motors Corporation announced that it would withdraw from
South Africa by selling its operations there to a group of investors led by
local G.M. managers. In a statement, G.M. Chairman Roger B. Smith said:
"We have been disappointed in the pace of change in ending apartheid.
Decisions about our investment in South Africa have depended on our as-
sessment of the economic, social and political environment there.")
29. See K. GOODPASTER & D. WHITESIDE, VELSICOL CHEMICAL CORPORA-
TION, supra note 19, at 6.
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ate an industry-wide system of pictograms to convey informa-
tion on the safe use of pesticides-especially for the small
farmer who was illiterate or could not understand the precau-
tionary information on current labels. The development of
this idea was evidence of the shift in mindset that Velsicol
had undergone during the previous decade.
The social values of both the industry and the regulatory
environment were not, however, congruent. Enthusiasm for
Velsicol's initiative was not sufficient to move the idea for-
ward, with the result that the CEO decided on economic
grounds not to continue the project. A number of managers,
discouraged by this decision, left the company. It appears
that the company was pursuing Type 3 thinking while others
in the industry, and the government, were marching to a dif-
ferent drum.
The lesson is that accommodation or fit between the or-
ganization and the wider system seems desirable, and that
some companies may succeed in influencing this fit while
others may not. Arthur Wiebel's views notwithstanding, cor-
porations sometimes can, and therefore sometimes should,
seek to positively influence moral views in the wider social
and economic system.
Balancing Microfits and Macrofits
The cases we have been discussing are not simple ones.
Their complexity derives from the fundamental values that
come into play, and from the tensions that arise when inter-
nal and external pressures conflict. Another powerful illustra-
tion of this complexity can be seen in the classic case of "The
Individual and the Corporation."30
After John F. Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, Donald
Singleton, senior vice-president of a large oil company based
in Dallas, Texas, wrote an article for Look magazine reflecting
on the meaning of the event. He took a position that caused
vexation in the Dallas business community." Although Sin-
30. MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 61.
31. In the article, Singleton suggested that the conservative attitudes
of Texas businessmen and a preoccupation with economic success were re-
sponsible for Kennedy's assassination in Dallas. Singleton wrote:
For all I know, other cities have our disease, too, but the epidemic
broke out here. Maybe the President could have caught it any-
where, but he caught it here. Here is where the quarantine sign is,
and I don't think it will ever really come down until we take it
down ourselves.
Singleton, Memo From a Dallas Citizen, LooK, March 24, 1964, at 88; re-
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gleton did not mention his business affiliation in the article,
the company received a number of negative letters and some
customers even returned credit cards. Singleton himself re-
ceived numerous letters and phone calls, most of which
praised his insight and courage. However, the pressure on
the company from the community eventually led to Single-
ton's resignation. Singleton told the Dallas Morning News:
When I resigned, . . . the impression got around that [the
company] asked for my resignation because it disagreed
with what I wrote. This is not what happened and obscures
the basic decision that most company men have to make, at
one moment or, more likely, on the installment plan.
About a month after the article, and hours after the
Dallas Morning News took me to its editorial-page woodshed
a second time, I was suddenly confronted with a company
demand: I must agree never to comment publicly without
formally clearing each word in advance and in writing. The
issue was not what I said, but whether I could say anything
at all.32
The challenges of microfit and macrofit came together
and interacted in this case on the subject of free speech. The
question was the value fit between Donald Singleton and the
corporation as well as the value fit between the corporation
and its social environment, both locally and nationally. Thus,
we can see how in the absence of strong corporate leadership,
pressures from society flowed through the corporation to af-
fect the individual.
Some practitioners and students have argued that in
Donald Singleton's situation the corporation "caved in" to
one set of pressures in the process of rigidly imposing an-
other set on the individual. Others have argued that Single-
ton either underestimated the need for congruence or over-
estimated his power to achieve it. The tragedy, if that is an
appropriate description, came from the lack of "space" for
moral initiative that either the corporation or the individual
were allowed. I am convinced that this drama continues to be
played out all too frequently in today's business world. Exper-
ienced and insightful executives often lose or are denied the
freedom to share their experience and insight as they rise to
positions of responsibility in corporate life.3 s
printed in substantial part in MATTHEwS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 65-
67.
32. MAT'rHEws & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 68 (reported in the
Dallas Morning News, April 15, 1964).
33. The best explanation of this loss of influence, that higher rank
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A second case emphasizes how the microfit challenge re-
lates to entire corporate divisions, not simply to the values of
individual executives. At the same time, it shows how the
macrofit challenge can come from sources beyond the market
and the law. This illustration may be of special interest in the
context of recent debates over friendly and unfriendly corpo-
rate takeovers.
A significant televison programming controversy erupted
nationally during 1980.1 In mid-January of 1981, top man-
agement at Consolidated Foods Corporation (CFC) in Chi-
cago was concerned. Some consumers were complaining and
threatening boycotts because of the content of the television
and print advertisements of the company's recently acquired
Hanes division; others objected to its sponsorship of televi-
sion programs thought to portray excessive sex or violence.
Organized groups had adopted progressively more sophisti-
cated tactics; simple letter-writing campaigns had evolved
into elaborate television monitoring and publicity efforts. In
addition, the groups had shifted their targets from the net-
works to advertisers and their parent companies.
John Bryan, chief executive officer of CFC, knew that
the protesting groups represented only a minority of consum-
ers. But he knew that other important groups that had chal-
lenged establishment values, including civil rights groups in
the sixties, had also been minorities. Such groups could work
through the political process for change, or they could bring
their concerns to the public through protests and boycotts. In
this case, no one wanted government censorship of networks
and advertisers. That left the networks and the advertisers as
targets. Bryan knew that corporations were being challenged
to re-examine their largely quantitative, market-following
media policies in favor of more qualitative, value-sensitive
policies.
Complicating Bryan's situation was Hanes's status as a re-
cent acquisition. Its corporate culture was less conservative
than that of its new parent company. Hanes had cultivated a
glamorous Madison Avenue image that was less cautious than
leads to closer identification with the corporation as a whole, seems to me
unsatisfactory as a justification for the corporate leader's loss of influence.
34. MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 250; see also Good-
paster, Should Sponsors Screen for Moral Values?, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
Dec. 1983, at 17. The company has since changed its name after
reorganization.
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the other divisions of CFC. From the viewpoint of competi-
tive strategy, some aspects of this cultural difference were
quite positive. But now the ethical aspects seemed to be the
focus of attention.
In this situation, CFC had to face questions about
whether and to what degree it was to be guided by shared
values. Could a diversified corporation effectively maintain
different, perhaps conflicting internal values among its com-
ponents? If so, could John Bryan avoid both the Scylla of
standing for nothing and the Charybdis of moral dogmatism
toward his business units? If not, what were the implications
for corporate ethics as more and more large organizations
grew by merger and acquisition?
John Bryan addressed the problem by quietly directing
the tightening up of advertising and programming guide-
lines, over the objections of divisional marketing personnel,
while "lying low" to avoid media attention and boycott "hit
lists." Most business leaders in a similar situation have done
the same.
One major advertiser, however, adopted a different pos-
ture. Owen Butler, Chairman of Procter & Gamble, made the
television issue the central theme in a widely quoted speech
to the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences. After cau-
tiously acknowledging the validity of the consumer protests,
Butler asserted:
For sound commercial reasons, we are not going to let our
advertising messages appear in an environment which we
think many of our potential customers will find distasteful.
Beyond that, we are going to be guided by our conscience
on the kind of material we sponsor. A corporation is not
without personality and character and conscience. A corpo-
ration like ours has a character which is the sum of all the
tens of thousands of people who have made up that corpo-
ration for more than 140 years, and our definition of the
kind of media which we would support with our advertising
has always involved some moral considerations. . . . It is
completely within our character not only to screen out
problem programs, but also to actively seek programs of ex-
ceptional artistic quality, which are truly inspirational and
which challenge the very best in human nature.8 5
35. Speech by Owen B. Butler, Television Can Show and Tell, But Can
It Listen?, before the Academy of Television Arts and Sciences (June 15,
1981), reprinted in MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 272.
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Many applauded Butler's public stand. Some, pointing to
certain afternoon soap operas sponsored by P&G, were more
cynical. Critics observed, however, that the quality of net-
work programming improved during the following year.
PART IV. THE CHALLENGE TO LEADERSHIP
This discussion of mindset stability raises two basic empir-
ical questions for future research. First, how do the moral
values of managers and business units at various levels in the
corporate hierarchy influence the moral values of the com-
pany as a whole (and conversely)? Second, how do the moral
values of corporations of various sizes in various sectors influ-
ence the moral values of the wider society (and conversely)?
The discussion also raises important ethical questions for
business leaders. Leaders who would sustain shared values
face an ethical paradox, one that is both philosophical and
practical. If mindset stability is truly an imperative, then it
would seem that values should be encouraged in a way that
commands maximum adherence among both management
(internally) and society (externally). Yet such a demand can
seem dogmatic and contrary to the freedom-respecting spirit
of the moral point of view." According to what can be called
the paradox of paternalism, it is essential to develop and sus-
tain a group conscience, yet nonetheless coercive to seek to
dictate the value orientation of others, whether inside or
outside the corporation. Resolving this paradox in practice is
one of the chief marks of responsible leadership.
The tension created by the paradox of paternalism
springs from two sources: first, the nature of the mindset in
question (content); and second, the way in which congruence
or fit is pursued (process).
The content issue (Types 1, 2a, 2b or 3) will influence the
direction in which the company encourages both internal and
external fit. A company with a Type I mindset, Amvac for
example, would presumably not encourage its managers (or
the surrounding community) to adopt a similar orientation
(self-interest alone), since it would be in the company's inter-
est for these parties to be relatively selfless. Similarly, a com-
pany like Viking Air Compressor with a Type 2a or 2b mind-
set would want its employees (and outside institutions) to be
guided by loyalty to its competitive advantage within the con-
36. For further discussion of "the moral point of view" see chapter
six of W.K. Frankena, ETHICS (1973).
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straints of the law and the regulatory process. Only in the
case of a Type 3 corporate orientation does it seem realistic to
expect congruence among mindset levels (person, organiza-
tion, community).
Type 3 thinking escapes the charge of fostering a double
standard for employees and the community in a way that the
other mindset types do not."7 But there is more to the para-
dox than the issue of content. Process is just as important.
Even within a Type 3 organization, if corporate advocacy is
highly specific and inflexible, the danger of what some call
-moral imperialism" is real. Both executives and the commu-
nity can feel threatened by too much moral pressure.
An instance of this intense moral pressure can be seen in
the case of the Massachusetts High Technology Council. 8
During 1980, the Council, an association of over 100 chief
executives of computer firms in Boston's Route 128 region,
sought to win personal tax reform for Massachusetts resi-
dents. The Council argued that the disproportionately high
property tax was making it difficult to attract and retain high
tech employees. It proposed a "social contract" that prom-
ised to add 60,000 new jobs to the state's economy if the tax
burden on individuals was reduced to the average rate of 17
competing industrial states. After resistance from the state
legislature, the Council joined forces with a citizen initiative
to seek a new tax law.
During the heated debate preceding passage of the new
law, and during the subsequent implementation period, the
Council was sharply criticized for imposing its values on the
public, forcing local communities to cut back on education,
law enforcement, and social services. The chief executive of
one member company resigned from the Council with the
following words:
Because the Massachusetts High Technology Council has
helped to create this policy disaster, we have decided to re-
sign in protest of the Council's ill-considered, socially divi-
sive, and economically destructive actions. 9
37. For an example of research along these lines, see the work of
psychoanalyst Michael Maccoby who argues that certain character traits are
selected against by the "psychostructure" of many corporations, affecting
the character of the organizations themselves. MAcCOBY, THE GAMESMAN:
THE NEW CORPORATE LEADERS (1976).
38. MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 182.
39. Letter from Clark C. Abt, President, ABT Assoc., Inc., to How-
ard Foley President, Massachusetts High Technology Council, Inc. (Jan.
20, 1981), reprinted in MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER, supra note 4, at 209.
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The Chairman of the Council, chief executive of another
member company, defended the public policy initiative in
ethical terms:
You may or may not agree that high tech was on the side of
the angels in this fight, but we were certainly on the side of
the people. And that's exactly where we should stay. For
perhaps the most significant aspect of this whole exciting
story is the alliance between the majority of the people in
this state and the industry we represent.4
It was clear that the Council saw itself as upholding the
basic values of rationality and respect as it sought a high de-
gree of congruence between the values of its employees, its
member organizations, and the wider community. It was also
clear, however, that its pursuit of this congruence through
the exercise of economic power in the public policy arena was
viewed with alarm. The paradox of paternalism was very
much at issue.
In Search of Pluralism
In a speech at the Harvard Business School in November
1984, James F. Ber6, Chairman and- Chief Executive Officer
of Borg-Warner, spoke of the importance of both flexibility
and patience in communicating shared values to those who
would eventually carry them on. Referring to his company's
"Beliefs" statement"1 he said:
The very last thing we want at Borg-Warner is to have our
people marching in lock-step. Managers at all levels must
make their own decisions in dealing with specific needs.
The Beliefs do not provide rules. They do provide stan-
dards against which individuals can test the actions that
seem necessary. They raise the ethical questions that should
be asked as part of any decision making. And they will inva-
riably be interpreted differently at different locations, de-
pending on the background, the traditions, and the mindset
of each individual. It may take a decade before a true com-
monality of attitude develops.42
40. MATTHEWS & GOODPASTER supra note 4, at 199.
41. See text, supra note 13.
42. Address by James F. Ber , Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Borg-Warner Corporation, at the Harvard Business School (Nov. 29,
1984) (on file with the author).
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Ber6's remarks indicate an understanding of value stabili-
zation not only as an exercise of influence by the corporation
on its future leaders, but also as a process that can move in
the reverse direction, that is, by individual values influencing
the larger organization. For in the development of what Bere
called "a true commonality of attitude" (what we have called
microfit), both parties should be capable of accommodation.
Only the medium range approach, it seems, allows for this
accommodation. The low range fails at influence in either di-
rection, while the high range involves the "lock-step" that
Ber6 rejects.
At the conclusion of his speech, Ber6 revealed an aware-
ness of the corresponding macrofit challenge:
I find a changing attitude outside the company equally en-
couraging. When the beliefs were first announced, they
were greeted with snickers by a few of my peers. That has
stopped. Now I am frequently asked by other CEOs how we
developed and introduced the beliefs. People may be wait-
ing to see how the fruit ripens, but they are no longer dis-
missing the idea out of hand. I think the climate is changing
throughout industry. 8
Perhaps we need to be reminded that part of the ethical
message is the ethical medium. How and with what kind of
forbearance should a company try to influence future leaders
and the wider community in the direction of a given Type 3
mindset? Once we ask this question, we begin to see that Type
3 thinking and the medium range of mindset congruence go
together in a natural way. The company that values respect
for others will be more likely to respect the values of others.
The medium range is the only range within which Type 3
values can effectively be sustained-in contrast not only with
Type I and Type 2 values, but also with high and low range
efforts to advocate Type 3. This is due to the way in which
respect figures so centrally in the orientation of the Type 3
leader. Respect fosters a self-moderating moral pluralism.
The high range is too dogmatic to allow for such respect,
while the low range is too relativistic to be stable. If the value
orientation of a corporation governs the strategy adopted for
sustaining it (a reasonable assumption in the absence of hy-
pocrisy), then medium-range Type 3 thinking will help the
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Conclusion
We need to understand the relationships among the
three levels of ethical decision making-person, organization
and wider community-if we are to clarify the leader's moral
responsibility. This responsibility requires not only orienting
and institutionalizing corporate conscience. It also requires
sustaining it by attending to the fit between the company's
values, the values of the individuals that will (or will not)
carry them on, and the values of the community that will (or
will not) be supportive. When respect is basic to corporate
values, the degree of fit that the leader seeks to develop and
sustain will tend to avoid the paradox of paternalism by strik-
ing an appropriate balance between relativism and
dogmatism.
